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1Issues and agenda
In Britain, employers currently have a great deal
of freedom to decide how many people to
employ and what pay and employment
conditions they should offer employees. British
employers have more freedom on these issues
than their counterparts in most other European
countries (Siebert, 1999) and in many ways they
have more freedom than they did, say, 20 years
ago. To some people, such room for manoeuvre
represents the natural state of affairs in a
capitalist or market economy. To others, it
shows the degree to which Britain has moved
away from the model of the mixed economy
embraced by most of Britain’s partners in the
European Union. Yet, there are limits – legal,
economic and social – to the jobs that employers
can create or destroy, both in terms of the
numbers of jobs and their ‘quality’.
In this report, we focus on how workers and
their representatives modify employers’
decisions about jobs and employment
conditions. When trade unions were more
powerful and well over half of all employees
belonged to them, a collective employee voice
through trade union representation was taken
for granted as modifying the behaviour of
employers. Wages were generally negotiated
wages and these were demonstrably higher than
for similar non-union workers (Stewart, 1983a).
Trade union pressure in pursuit of the
protection of jobs was also common, although
less often successful. But, nowadays, unions
represent a third of employees or less and they
have been hit by a tide of legislative restrictions
that limit their negotiating power. So we
address the following questions in this report:
• Do trade unions have an impact on
employers’ decisions about jobs?
• Do unions still negotiate higher pay than
would otherwise be the case?
• Are other conditions of employment
affected in similar ways?
• Do any non-union forms of employee
representation make a difference?
Public policy on employee ‘voice’ at work
Employment relations in Britain have
developed within a legal framework often
described as ‘voluntarism’. In the 1980s and
1990s, employers were under no obligation to
recognise trade unions for collective bargaining
or for any other purposes – and this remains
generally the case. Those who do recognise
unions are put under some limited legal
obligations, such as consulting with union
representatives when collective redundancies
are planned or when certain health or safety
matters are at issue. The agreements that arise
from collective bargaining about pay and other
conditions are not legally enforceable.1 Nor are
they ‘extended’ to give effect as legal minima
elsewhere in the same industry or region, as
happens in many other European countries.
Employers who do not voluntarily recognise a
union are obliged to consult other ‘appropriate
representatives’ of employees about collective
redundancies and some other matters. But these
obligations have little impact on employers’
decisions about the size of their workforces
(Dickens and Hall, 1995) and none at all upon
the terms on which they engage employees –
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the obligation to consult is a far cry from an
obligation to negotiate and agree. The law does,
of course, place some limits on what employers
can pay their employees. The obligation to pay
women and men equally for work of equal
value is the longest standing of these limits; the
recently introduced National Minimum Wage
sets a floor for the pay of the lowest paid
workers. But these legal obligations give no
direct support to the representative institutions
that give employees a role in pay determination
or that can bring pressure to bear on employers
on employment matters more generally.
One recent development has done so,
however. The Employment Relations Act
contains a provision for employers to recognise
a trade union ‘where a majority of the workforce
wants it’ (Department of Trade and Industry,
1998). The provision came into force on 6 June
2000. Secondary legislation specifies how
collective bargaining about pay, hours and
holidays shall be conducted, where the trade
union achieves recognition under the new legal
provisions. But it does not specify how a failure
to agree at the final stage of the bargaining
process shall be resolved.2 In the USA, one-third
of new bargaining units brought about by the
procedures failed to produce an initial wage
agreement (Dunlop Commission, 1994). As with
all other situations of voluntary union
recognition in Britain, collective bargaining
consequent upon statutory recognition may
become a simple trial of strength in which the
employer generally has the resources to prevail.
There is also the prospect of the current
limited obligations to inform and consult
employees being extended by European Union
requirements. The draft directive on information
and consultation, issued in November 1998,
proposes information and consultation
requirements relating to:
• recent and ‘reasonably foreseeable’
developments in the business
• the structure of, and prospects for,
employment
• offsetting measures where employment is
under threat
• decisions likely to produce substantial
changes in contractual relations with
employees.
These developments make it especially
appropriate at the present time to examine how
the largely voluntary system of negotiation and
consultation about jobs and employment
conditions in Britain has been working. But,
first, we briefly summarise how the context of
that system has changed in recent years,
changes that, to a large degree, have
strengthened the hands of employers in their
dealings with employees.
How employers and workplaces have
changed during the 1990s
The reshaping of industry – much in evidence in
the 1980s – continued in the 1990s. There was
further expansion of private sector service
activities, particularly in new workplaces, with
wholesale and retail activities and business
services experiencing substantial growth in
employment. In contrast, private sector
manufacturing industries continued to contract,
having been hit hard by the recession of the
early 1990s. In the public sector, activities
continued to be contracted out to the private
sector from local authorities and the National
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Health Service, whilst privatisation was
extended to the electricity industry, British Rail
and British Coal.
Product markets were said to be increasingly
competitive in the 1990s and organisations faced
rising demands to contain costs. Customers
exerted greater pressure on prices and this
combined with more widespread demands from
shareholders for quick and profitable returns on
their investments (Burchell et al., 1999, pp. 5–9).
Competition also increasingly took on an
international dimension, with greater import
penetration in manufacturing industries and a
near doubling of foreign-owned workplaces in
the private sector.3
The labour market also became more
competitive over the decade. In 1999,
unemployment stood at its lowest level for
nearly 20 years after substantial rises in the
early 1980s and early 1990s. Regional differences
became accentuated, at least in the late 1990s:
the unemployment rate in the most favoured
region (the South East, excluding London) was
only one-third of the rate in the least favoured
region (the North East of England) in 1999,
compared with one-half of it in 1995.4
Occupational differences in labour demand
remained much as they were in the early 1990s,
however. In 1998, professional workers had an
unemployment rate only 23 per cent of the rate
for unskilled workers, little changed from the
comparable figure for 1992.5
Employees, for their part, were required to
become more flexible in the tasks they
performed and in the hours they worked. The
intensity of work was also shown to have
increased (Green, 1999), but this was
accompanied by greater feelings of insecurity, at
least for those in higher paid occupations, who
became less optimistic than lower paid workers
during the 1990s (Burchell et al., 1999, p. 18).
Managers were seeking closer and more direct
links with their workforce, both as a means of
strengthening employee commitment and
enhancing work quality. But this approach was
often viewed as being at odds with traditional,
indirect methods of representation, most
obviously those involving trade unions.
How employee voice changed in the 1990s
The institutions through which employers and
employees jointly regulated employment
relations experienced severe decline in the 1980s
and 1990s. Employers’ associations ceased to co-
ordinate wage settlements in many industries.
But the greatest decline was in the institutions
of collective representation for employees. Trade
unions lost members until the end of the 1990s
and they represented fewer workers in
collective bargaining. Table 1 compares the
situation in 1998 with that in 1990, using six
indicators of union representation and two of
non-union voice. Over that period:
• fewer workplaces had any union
members
• the proportion of employees belonging to
a union fell by nearly a quarter
• the proportion of workplaces with
recognised unions fell by a fifth
• workplaces where union bargaining
covered most employees dropped by
nearly a third (nearly a half in the private
sector)
• the proportion of employees covered by
union pay bargaining fell by a fifth
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• workplaces with a union-based joint
consultative committee (JCC) dropped by
a half.
On all these measures, union representation
became less widespread, particularly in the
private sector of the economy where most
people are employed. To a small degree, the loss
of union representation was offset by a rise in
the incidence of non-union consultative
committees. However, non-union employee
representatives became no more common.
Broadly speaking, there was a severe fall in the
extent to which employees had a collective
voice to represent their concerns and views to
management. And, where union representation
remained, it showed signs of becoming weaker
in many respects (Millward et al., 2000, Chapter
5). Thus, employees’ influence upon employers’
decisions about jobs and pay levels declined at a
time when increased competition in product
markets gained greater salience in those
decisions.
The data and methods of research
We have used nationally representative surveys
of workplaces and their employees as the basis
for the research summarised in this report. The
two main sources are the Workplace Employee
Relations Survey (WERS) of 1998 and its
predecessor, the 1990 Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS). The surveys covered
all industries except agriculture and coal
mining, and included both private and publicly
owned establishments. Further details of the
surveys are given in Cully et al. (1999) and
Millward et al. (1992, 2000). The survey results
can be generalised with confidence to the
population of workplaces in Great Britain
employing ten or more employees in 1998 (25 or
more in 1990).
Table 1 Trade union representation, 1990 and 1998
All workplaces Private sector Public sector
Percentage of 1990 1998 1990 1998 1990 1998
Workplaces with a union member 64 54 49 37 99 97
Employees who are union members 47 36 36 26 72 57
Workplaces with recognised unions 53 42 38 25 87 87
Workplaces where bargaining
covered most employees 42 29 30 16 71 63
Employees covered by collective
bargaining 54 44 41 33 78 68
Workplaces with union-based JCC 14 6 8 3 27 9
Workplaces with non-union JCC 12 17 10 16 18 22
Non-union workplaces with
employee representative 10 11 11 12 0 2
Source: Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) 1990 and Workplace Employee Relations
Survey (WERS) 1998; workplaces with 25 or more employees.
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For the analysis reported in Chapters 2 and
3, we use the panel of workplaces contained
within the two surveys of 1990 and 1998. In
Chapter 2, the data mostly come from the 1990
management interview, supplemented by a pre-
interview questionnaire about the
establishment’s workforce. These data on 2,061
workplaces provide the starting point for
examining which sorts of workplace closed or
survived by the time of the 1998 survey. In 1998,
efforts were made to contact all of the 1990
surveyed workplaces, some to conduct the
panel interview, others simply to determine
whether they were still in existence and had at
least 25 employees. From this information, the
1990 sample was divided into ‘closures’ and
‘survivors’ for the analysis of factors that
increased the likelihood of closure. Chapter 2
examines how trade unions and other forms of
employee voice have an impact upon
management decisions regarding workplace
closures.
The analysis of employment changes in
Chapter 3 is based upon the 1990 management
interview and the corresponding interview in
1998 at a sample of those workplaces that had
survived. The 1990 interview data are used to
characterise these continuing workplaces before
they grew or shrank over the subsequent period
up to 1998. The sample for this analysis is 834
workplaces with at least 25 employees in both
1990 and 1998. The chapter focuses on the
impact of the various forms of employee voice
upon the growth or shrinkage of workplaces
over the period 1990 to 1998.
We use two linked elements of the 1998
cross-section survey for our analysis of pay
levels in Chapter 4. One is the management
interview, carried out face to face with the
senior workplace manager responsible for
personnel or employee relations. The other is
the survey of employees, administered within
workplaces where a management interview had
been achieved. This short, self-completion
questionnaire was distributed to a random
sample of 25 employees in each co-operating
workplace, yielding 28,237 usable returns.6
They are representative of employees in Great
Britain employed in all but the very smallest
workplaces. Data from the appropriate
management interview were linked to these
data for the employee-based analysis. Chapter 4
examines the union impact on wage levels and
fringe benefit provision.
The analysis of pay settlements in Chapter 5
uses only the management interview data from
the 2,191 workplaces covered by WERS 1998.
The pay settlement in question was the most
recent one for the largest occupational group
within each workplace; where possible, the
characteristics of this group are considered, in
preference to those of the workplace as a whole.
Again, the focus is on union effects.
Methods of analysis
In each of Chapters 2 to 5, we focus on a
principal ‘outcome’ and examine how a number
of selected characteristics of employers and
employee representation have an impact on this
outcome. In doing so, we have to take account
of other factors which might also be associated
with it. For example, when examining whether
trade unions raise pay levels, it is important to
take account of the personal and job
characteristics that also affect employees’ pay.
Multivariate statistical methods have been used
to control for these other factors as far as
possible. Unless otherwise stated, it is always
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these multivariate results that are being
reported; the phrase ‘controlling for other
employee and workplace characteristics’ should
be taken as implied. The statistical methods we
have used always take account of the complex
sample design used for the surveys, but they
vary according to the nature of the outcome
being examined.
More detailed accounts of the research
Chapters 2 and 3 draw on more detailed reports
of the analysis of workplace closure and
creation, and of employment change in
continuing workplaces (Bryson, 2001; Millward
et al., 2000). Chapters 4 and 5 are similarly based
upon more detailed accounts of the research
(Forth and Millward, 2000a, 2000b). All four
sources give further information on the data
and statistical methods used.
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The labour market is commonly viewed in an
atomistic fashion, consisting of hosts of
individual job matches between employees and
employers. But an equally valid approach is to
see it from the viewpoint of the workplace, with
the total employment of the economy consisting
of the sum of jobs in all workplaces. From this
angle, changes in the total number of employees
in employment arise from three sources: the
setting up of new workplaces; the closure of
existing ones; and the shrinkage and expansion
of existing workplaces.
In this chapter and the next, we consider the
role played by unions in decisions to close
workplaces and to expand or contract
employment. Our focus is what happened to
workplaces in existence in 1990. Here we
concentrate on workplace closure, the most
dramatic manifestation of a management
decision to reduce the number of jobs. By
‘closure’ we mean the complete cessation of the
activities of a workplace with the termination of
all contracts of employment.1
There are several reasons why we do not
give equal attention to the jobs created by newly
established workplaces during the same period.
After all, new workplaces accounted for one-
fifth of all workplaces in 1998, and one-sixth of
all employment, if we exclude the very small
workplaces excluded from WERS 1998. The first
reason for omitting detailed analysis of new
workplaces is because the prospect of possible
unionisation is unlikely to deter managers from
setting them up.2 This is especially so for new
firms with a single workplace. Decisions to set
up new workplaces within multi-site
organisations could be influenced by
experiences of union activity elsewhere in the
same organisation, if it exists.3 However, there is
no recent survey dataset that could be used to
address this issue through statistical analysis.
Second, even for new workplaces set up
between 1990 and 1998, there is no information
in WERS 1998 on the circumstances facing
management at the time they set up the new
workplace, or indeed decided not to set up
others. Consequently, we can say nothing about
any role unions might have in discouraging or
encouraging the establishment of new
workplaces. Third, although we could say
something about employment growth among
workplaces set up since 1990, these workplaces
are only a little younger than our 1990 sample.
We think the best guide to their employment
changes is the pattern of employment change of
workplaces existing in 1990, which we describe in
Chapter 3.
How unions might affect workplace closure
In representing workers’ interests, unions are
engaged in a balancing act. They seek to
improve the terms under which their members
are employed, putting pressure on employers to
offer more than they might otherwise offer in
the absence of a union. However, if they press
too hard, they may drive employers to concede
more than the firm can bear, reducing
profitability to the point where the viability of
the workplace is put at risk. Union pressure will
only result in closure where unions are strong
vis-à-vis the employer, the employer’s financial
or market position is poor, and the unions do
little to improve workplace performance. If, on
the other hand, unions only exert pressure
where they know the employer can afford the
2 Workplace closure
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better terms, or where their own actions have
improved productivity and profitability,
employers may be able to meet union demands
without jeopardising the workplace’s future. So,
it is a reasonable question as to whether unions
increase, decrease, or have no effect on the
chances of workplace closure.
How to measure the effects of unions and
workplace characteristics on workplace
closure
To establish the effect of unions on workplace
closure during the 1990s, we need detailed
information on how workplaces were unionised
at the beginning of the period, and whether or
not they had closed by the end of the period.
But we must also make allowance for other
factors affecting their fortunes. The ones most
often highlighted in research studies are:
• the size, ownership, age and location of
the workplace
• the profitability of the business
• the ability of the employer to adjust to
downturns in demand
• the competitiveness of the markets to
which the employer provides goods or
services
• other features of that industry.
These features, and extensive data on union
representation, are available within a particular
dataset created as part of the 1990–98 WIRS
panel. All the 2,061 workplaces interviewed in
WIRS 1990 were followed up to establish
whether they had closed by 1998 or survived.4
Our analysis of those data examines which
features of the workplace and its circumstances
in 1990 statistically predict the likelihood of
closure by 1998.
Between 1990 and 1998, 25 per cent of
workplaces closed in private sector
manufacturing. In private sector services, 15 per
cent closed in the same period and in the public
sector the figure was 7 per cent. The question
addressed in the remainder of this chapter is:
how was the likelihood of closure affected by
factors at the discretion of management, and
how far was it influenced by the behaviour of
unions?
Workplace closure in the private sector
The results largely bear out expectations based
upon previous studies. They show that the
chances of workplace closure in the 1990s were:
• higher in declining industries, such as
leather, footwear and clothing, and lower
in expanding sectors, such as banking,
finance and insurance
• higher where the workforce was
predominantly manual, rather than non-
manual
• lower for larger workplaces
• lower for single, independent workplaces
than for workplaces belonging to larger
enterprises
• higher for workplaces where performance
was poor in 1990 or earlier, as measured
by financial performance, capacity
utilisation and employment change
• lower in workplaces using flexible
employment contracts
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• lower in workplaces with a diversified
product base
• higher in workplaces facing more
intensive competition.
Workplace managers may have relatively
little influence over some of these factors that
affect the likelihood of closure, such as
ownership and competitive conditions. Equally,
there are other factors, such as the deployment
of labour and product diversity, which they can
affect.
The union impact on closure in the private
sector
The factors mentioned above were taken into
account when we looked to see what effect trade
unions and other employee representation
arrangements had on workplace closure.
In general, we found that private sector
workplaces recognising unions for pay
bargaining were no more likely to close than
non-unionised workplaces. As in the 1980s
(Machin, 1995), this was so, regardless of the
strength of the union and the market conditions
faced by the workplace.5 There were, however,
some clear effects stemming from trade unions
when manufacturing and services were
examined separately and when different types
of union representation were distinguished.
Private services
The results for the private services sector can be
stated very briefly. Unions had no discernible
impact on workplace closure in private services.
Private manufacturing industry
In contrast, unions generally increased the
likelihood of closure in the private
manufacturing sector. The average impact of
unions was to increase the chances of closure by
15 per cent, relative to similar manufacturing
workplaces that were not unionised (Table 2).
The effect, however, was not universal; it varied
with the type of employees covered by the
union, the bargaining arrangements in place
and whether unions negotiated over
employment.
The nature of union representation in
manufacturing
Recognised unions representing only manual
workers at the workplace were the only ones
that increased the chances of closure in
manufacturing. They did so by 19 per cent,
relative to similar non-unionised workplaces. By
contrast, workplaces with unions representing
only non-manual workers at the workplace
were 14 per cent less likely to close than similar
workplaces without such unions. Unions
representing both manual and non-manual
workers had no impact on closure. Since the
analyses controlled for the proportion of manual
workers at the workplace, industrial sector and
industry-level unionisation, the increased
likelihood of closure in the presence of unions
representing manual workers cannot be
explained purely by industrial decline in
traditional industries with heavily unionised
manual workers. Nor can it be explained by
their strength since, on nearly all measures of
union strength, unions representing manual
workers were weaker than unions representing
non-manual workers. It may be that
negotiations in the manufacturing sector
involving management and unions representing
only manual workers take less account of the
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possible consequences for the whole workforce.
But, whatever the explanation, it seems that the
effect can be mitigated by broadening the
occupational scope of union representation at
the workplace. Having a recognised union
representing non-manual workers reduced the
likelihood of closure in the private
manufacturing sector; and unions representing
the broad spectrum of occupations, both manual
and non-manual, were neutral in their impact.
The number of recognised unions at the
workplace also had a bearing on closure rates.
Where there was a single recognised union, the
chances of closure were significantly higher
than for comparable non-union workplaces. But,
where there were two or more unions, the
likelihood of closure was no different. Together
with the previous results, this result suggests
that it is unions representing a narrow range of
occupations that increase the chances of plant
closure in manufacturing, possibly by pursuing
sectional interests to the detriment of the plant
as a whole.
A third important characteristic of union
representation was whether the scope of union
bargaining included employment levels, not just
pay. Where unions had no role in determining
staffing levels or recruitment, the likelihood of
Table 2 Effects of unions on likelihood of workplace closure in private manufacturing, 1990–98
Percentage difference in the
likelihood of closure Percentage of workplaces
compared with workplaces with this kind of union
Union status in 1990 with no recognised unions  representation
Recognised unions present +15* 44
Any recognised union representing
only manual workers +19** 34
Any recognised union representing
only non-manual workers –14** 9
Recognised union representing both
manual and non-manual workers –3 17
Single recognised union +21* 22
Two or more recognised unions +8 22
Recognised unions and:
No negotiation on employment +19* 26
Negotiations about staffing levels +13 6
Negotiations about recruitment +7 2
Negotiations about both staffing
levels and recruitment +9 10
Source: WIRS 1990–98 panel; workplaces with 25 or more employees in 1990.
Key to significance: * = 95% confidence; ** = 99% confidence.
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closure was higher. But, where managements
did allow unions a role in determining these
aspects of employment, the chances of closure
were no different from those of non-unionised
plants. This may be because unions become
more sensitive to the employment consequences
of their wage claims where management
involves them in decisions over employment.
Or it may be that an involvement in the broader
set of issues affecting the future of the plant
engenders a more constructive relationship
between unions and management.
A further characteristic of management–
employee relationships that had an impact on
plant closures in private manufacturing was the
complexity of representation and
communication arrangements. The most
complex arrangements, involving union
representation and alternative, non-union
channels of communication, had a particularly
high rate of closure. This may be because the
different channels deal with different issues and
discourage a holistic consideration of matters
affecting the viability of the plant.
Non-union representation
Management–employee communication
channels that were not built on union
representation spread during the 1990s
(Millward et al., 2000). Their increasing use may
have been occasioned in part by employers’
belief that this would bring benefits to the firm
that were not associated with union-based
channels of communication. If this was the case,
it is not apparent in our analyses of workplace
closure in manufacturing. The likelihood of
closure was not reduced by the presence of non-
union communication channels, compared with
similar workplaces that did not have them.6
Workplace closure in the public sector
Compared with the private sector, where the
closure of a workplace indicates economic
failure, sometimes of a whole enterprise,
workplace closure in the public sector may have
different origins. In the period covered by our
analysis, many services provided by local and
central government were removed from public
sector employment and contracted out to the
private sector (Corby and White, 1999, p. 8); in
some cases, the result will have been workplace
closures and job losses. Furthermore, although
the public sector was much more heavily
unionised than the private sector throughout
the 1990s, negotiations about pay and
employment conditions were conducted against
a backdrop of spending limits and reviews,
rather than what the market would bear.
Consequently, theories regarding the impact of
unions on economic viability that inform our
understanding of workplace closure in the
private sector have little relevance for the public
sector. This led to a smaller number of factors
being taken into account when the possible
effects of trade unions were being examined.7
On average, public sector workplaces were
no more likely to close if they had unions that
were recognised for pay bargaining than if they
did not. However, particular forms of union
representation were associated with a higher
likelihood of closure: multiple unions and those
with enough influence to limit management’s
ability to organise staff in the way they wanted.
Although these effects were statistically
significant, they were small relative to the
corresponding effects in private manufacturing
industry. This may reflect the lower absolute
rate of closure in the public sector over the
12
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period and the smaller amount of variation in
union representation there.
Summary
Broadly speaking, workplace closures during
the period 1990 to 1998 were little affected by
whether workplaces had union representation
in 1990. In the private sector, workplace
performance, market conditions, workforce
composition and structural features of the
workplace, such as size and ownership, were far
more important. However, the impact of unions
was clearly discernible in private sector
manufacturing. Closure in this sector was more
likely where there had been unions representing
a section of the workforce, such as only manual
workers, and where unions were excluded from
negotiating with management about
employment matters such as recruitment and
staffing levels. Where representation and
negotiating arrangements were comprehensive,
the potential negative effects of unions were
absent.
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The previous chapter showed that certain types
of trade union representation were associated
with a greater likelihood of workplace closure
during the 1990s, although there was no general
association with trade union presence per se. Yet
those results tell only a minor part of the more
general picture about the possible impact of
unions on employment. The major part of the
picture comes from an analysis of unions’
impact on the numbers employed in continuing
workplaces.
How unions might affect workplace
employment levels
The activities of trade unions may have positive
and negative effects on the level of employment
in a particular workplace. If successful in raising
wages, unions may depress employment levels
by making labour costly relative to capital, in
which case employers will tend to substitute
capital for labour. Higher labour costs may also
discourage employers from hiring additional
workers, and adversely affect sales – either
directly by forcing up prices, or indirectly by
reducing the capacity of the firm to reinvest. On
the other hand, higher wages may help to avoid
labour shortages by encouraging existing
employees to remain with the employer and by
attracting new recruits.
By restraining their wage claims in hard
times, unions may help to avoid future
redundancies. Strong unions may also play a
role in maintaining artificially high levels of
employment, by enforcing restrictive work
practices. But unions can directly promote
employment growth by supporting
productivity-enhancing initiatives. Indirect
effects may also arise if unions improve skill
levels by raising recruitment standards and
encouraging training. Both are examples of
ways in which the union may play a role in the
improvement of company performance which
could, potentially, lead to further job creation.
Research suggests that unions inhibited the
expansion of workplaces in the 1980s, to the
extent that employment levels in unionised
workplaces grew by 2–3 per cent less per
annum than in similar, non-unionised
workplaces (Blanchflower et al., 1991; Booth and
McCulloch, 1999). In this chapter, we investigate
the impact of trade unions on employment
change in the 1990s.
The involvement of trade unions in
negotiations about employment levels
The evidence from the WIRS surveys is that
unions are less commonly involved in
negotiating about employment levels than they
are about wages, as shown in Table 3. Managers
reported negotiations with recognised unions
about staffing levels or recruitment in under
one-third of all workplaces in 1990, compared
with a half of workplaces where they negotiated
about wages. Employment negotiations of this
kind were relatively common in the public
sector, occurring in nearly two-thirds of
workplaces; in the private sector they were
much more rare, occurring in less than one-fifth
of workplaces. There were fewer workplaces –
and many fewer in the private sector – where
both staffing levels and recruitment were
negotiated. Thus, the opportunities for unions
to directly affect the frequent decisions of
employers and managers to adjust employment
levels were limited, especially in the private
sector. Moreover, even where these matters were
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reportedly the subject of negotiations with
unions, it could still be the case that the unions
had little or no impact on the decisions to create
new jobs or declare some existing jobs
redundant.
Measuring the impact of unions on
workplace employment levels
The information needed to assess the impact of
unions on the expansion, or contraction, of
workplace employment levels is similar to the
information needed to assess its impact on
workplace closure. We require information on
the nature of union representation at the
workplace, together with information on other
characteristics that might influence the numbers
employed there, all of which should be
measured at the beginning of the period we
want to observe. The ones most often
highlighted in research studies are:
• the size, ownership, age and location of
the workplace
• the type of goods made or services
provided
• the competitiveness of the markets to
which the employer provides those goods
or services
• the ability of the employer to adjust to
downturns in demand
• the nature of the workforce
• the ability of the employer to elicit
maximum productivity from employees
• the profitability of the business
• technological change within the
workplace and among its competitors
• local labour market conditions.
Table 3 Extent of trade union negotiations over employment matters by sector, 1990
Private
All manufac- Private Public
Percentage of workplaces with workplaces turing services sector
Recognised unions 53 44 36 87
Any recognised unions that:
Negotiate about staffing levels or recruitment 29 18 13 63
Negotiate about staffing levels, but not recruitment 10 6 6 17
Negotiate about recruitment, but not staffing levels 1 2 † 2
Negotiate staffing levels and recruitment 19 10 7 44
Negotiate neither staffing levels nor recruitment 24 26 23 24
Source: WIRS 1990 and WERS 1998; workplaces with 25 or more employees.
† Less than 0.5 per cent but greater than 0.
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Of course, we also require information on
the numbers employed by the workplace at the
start and end of the period in question. This
extensive range of data is available for a subset
of workplaces within the 1990–98 WIRS panel.
The panel survey collected detailed information
about 846 surviving workplaces, including the
size of their workforce in 1998. Using
information from these 846 workplaces, we are
able to examine which features and
circumstances of the workplace in 1990 are
statistically associated with a net change in the
numbers employed over the following eight-
year period.1
In fact, the detailed information that we
require was only collected in workplaces with
25 or more employees in 1998. Our sample does
not therefore include those workplaces that
shrank to employ less than 25 employees in
1998, nor those that had closed down. As a
result, in this chapter, we are only able to
present a detailed examination of the workplace
characteristics that were statistically associated
with employment change among workplaces with
25 or more employees in both 1990 and 1998.
To the extent that certain types of union
representation are associated with an increased
likelihood of workplace closure or shrinkage
below 25 employees, the findings presented in
this chapter will constitute upwardly biased
estimates of unions’ impact on employment
growth across the whole range of outcomes.2
But, since workplace closure was little affected
by whether workplaces had union
representation in 1990 (see Chapter 2), one
might expect the degree of bias to be relatively
small.
Influences on workplace employment levels
vary markedly between the public and private
sectors. Accordingly, we present the results for
the two sectors of the economy separately.
Change in workplace employment levels in
the private sector
Two-thirds of private sector workplaces
continued to operate with 25 or more employees
between 1990 and 1998. Employment in these
workplaces grew at a very modest rate of one-
third of 1 per cent per annum, on average. This
meant that the level of employment in the
average, continuing private sector workplace
grew by 2.8 per cent over the period.
It is perhaps surprising to note that private
sector manufacturing workplaces grew at a
slightly faster rate than those engaged in service
activities: the mean rate of growth was 0.46 per
cent per annum in manufacturing, compared
with 0.3 per cent in service industries (Table 4).
This shows that the well-documented decline in
manufacturing employment occurred because
new entrants to the sector were smaller and less
numerous than those leaving it through closure.
The number of manufacturing jobs lost through
closures was almost treble the number created
by new manufacturing workplaces over the
1990s. In contrast, in the services sector, roughly
two-thirds more jobs were created through start-
ups than were lost through closures.
Our analysis of employment change in
continuing private sector workplaces controls as
far as possible for differences in the
characteristics of workplaces, their market
circumstances and their performance, all of
which previous research shows can have a
bearing on the numbers employed at an
establishment. As in previous studies, we find
the rate of workplace employment growth to be:
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• lower in larger workplaces
• higher in workplaces with a diversified
product base
• variable across regions
• variable across industries.
Influence of unions on workplace
employment levels in the private sector
In simple descriptive terms, employment levels
in workplaces with recognised unions actually
declined by an average of 1.8 per cent per
annum between 1990 and 1998, whereas
employment levels in those without unions
grew by an average of 1.4 per cent per annum.
The annual rate of growth of employment was
therefore around 3 percentage points lower
among workplaces with recognised unions. This
would appear to suggest that unions were still
acting to depress workplace employment levels
in the 1990s, as they had done in the previous
decade.
To investigate this further, we took account
of the many other factors known to impact upon
workplace employment – summarised in the
previous section – and sought to identify the
independent effect of unions on workplace
employment levels. Table 5 shows a selection of
the results.
After taking account of other factors, the
annual rate of growth in employment in private
sector workplaces with recognised trade unions
was around 4 percentage points lower than in
similar workplaces without recognised unions.
So, the independent effect of trade union
recognition in the private sector was actually
slightly larger than suggested by the raw,
unadjusted figures. Further investigation
showed that union recognition had a larger
downward impact on employment levels in
service sector workplaces than in
manufacturing establishments. Within private
sector services, the presence of recognised trade
unions depressed the growth rate by 4.7
percentage points, on average. This compared
with 3.4 percentage points in private sector
manufacturing.
Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that
unions might adversely affect employment
levels by inhibiting the reinvestment of capital.
But this did not appear to explain the negative
association that we found between union
recognition and employment growth in the
private sector. The negative union effect was
present in workplaces that had introduced new
Table 4 Change in workplace employment per annum, by sector, 1990–98
Change in workplace
employment All All Private Private Public
(% per annum) workplaces private sector manufacturing services sector
Mean 1.0 0.34 0.46 0.30 1.48
Source: WIRS 1990 and WERS 1998; workplaces with 25 or more employees.
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plant, machinery and equipment over the
period 1987–90, as well as in those that had not.
It was also suggested that unions engaging
in restrictive working practices might help to
maintain artificially high employment levels. A
negative union effect might therefore represent
the outcome of removing such restrictions as
unions became weaker. If this were the case, one
would expect the effect to be confined to
workplaces in which unions were limiting
management’s ability to organise work in 1990.
But, in practice, the negative union effect on
employment growth over the 1990s was also
apparent in workplaces where recognised
unions were not limiting work organisation at
the start of the period.
Clearly, other factors lay behind the negative
effect of union recognition on employment
growth. But it did not appear to represent an
age or cohort effect, whereby unionised
Table 5 Influence of unions on workplace employment levels in the private sector, 1990–98
All private sector Private manufacturing Private services
Recognised unions –4.2** –3.4* –4.7**
Any recognised unions that:
Negotiate over staffing levels
or recruitment –2.2 –2.8 –1.4
Negotiate neither staffing
levels nor recruitment –5.0** –3.6* –6.1**
Proportion of employees at
workplace covered by collective
bargaining (%):
1–49 –4.0 –2.0 –4.4
50–69 –4.5** –3.6 –5.6*
70–99 –2.6* –2.4 –3.0
100 –5.2** –5.7* –5.0*
Single recognised union –3.7** –2.0 –4.1**
Multiple recognised unions –4.9** –4.6* –5.8**
Nature of employee voice:
Union arrangements only –7.0** –3.4 –8.7**
Union and non-union
arrangements –4.3** –3.6 –4.8*
Non-union arrangements only –1.4 –0.5 –1.8
Source: WIRS 1990 and WERS 1998; private sector workplaces with 25 or more employees.
Key to significance: * = 95% confidence; ** = 99% confidence.
Note: Figures given in table represent the average percentage point difference in the rate of change
in workplace employment per annum, compared with workplaces without recognised unions.
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workplaces appear to have slower rates of
growth simply because they tend to be older
and have more stable employment levels than
younger workplaces. Categorising younger
workplaces, somewhat arbitrarily, as those in
existence for 20 years or less in 1990, and older
workplaces as those in existence for 21 years or
more, there were no significant differences in
the union effect across the two age groups.
The impact of different types of union
representation
Although these results demonstrate a general,
negative effect on employment levels in the
1990s arising from union recognition, it is
conceivable that different forms of union
representation are associated with different
outcomes. Our analysis of workplace closure in
the private sector, presented in Chapter 2,
showed that a workplace was more likely to
close if unions negotiated over wages but had
no role in determining staffing levels or
recruitment. The analysis of employment
change shows similar results. The annual rate of
growth in workplaces where unions negotiated
over wages, but not staffing or recruitment, was
5 per cent lower than in workplaces where
unions were not recognised. But the annual rate
of growth in workplaces where unions
negotiated over wages and employment,
although slightly lower, was not significantly
different from that in non-unionised workplaces
(Table 5). These findings add weight to the
suggestions, made in Chapter 2, that unions
which are involved in employment decisions
may either have more constructive relationships
with management or may be more sensitive to
the employment consequences of their wage
claims.
Union strength and coverage
If union recognition has a general, negative
effect on employment, one might also expect the
magnitude of the effect to be conditional upon
the strength of the union at the workplace. A
commonly used measure of strength is the
proportion of employees at the workplace
whose pay is set through collective bargaining.
And the results presented in Table 5 do show a
relationship between the coverage of collective
bargaining and changes in employment. In the
analysis of the private sector as a whole, unions
were found to have statistically significant
associations with lower rates of employment
growth only where collective bargaining
covered at least half of the workforce at the
establishment. However, the relationship with
the level of coverage was not linear and,
although coverage of between 70 and 99 per
cent was associated with lower employment
growth when compared with no coverage, the
magnitude of the effect was quite small relative
to that in adjacent categories (–2.6 per cent per
annum, compared with –4.5 per cent where
coverage was between 50 and 69 per cent). One
possibility was that unions with coverage of
between 70 and 99 per cent were most likely to
negotiate over wages and employment, this
acting to mitigate some of the negative
association with the level of coverage. However,
upon further investigation, this did not appear
to be the case.
Looking at the separate analyses within
manufacturing and services, it is notable that, in
manufacturing, unions were associated with
significantly lower rates of employment growth
only when all of the employees at a workplace
were covered by wage bargaining. In service
industries, differences between various levels of
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coverage were less pronounced, and statistically
significant negative effects were found to be
associated with coverage of 50–69 per cent and
100 per cent.
It is apparent that the negative association
between union recognition and employment
growth in the private sector could be identified
in cases where either single or multiple unions
were recognised (Table 5). Nevertheless, the
negative association with the recognition of a
single union was restricted to service sector
workplaces. In manufacturing, a negative
association was only found in workplaces
recognising more than one union.
Non-union representation
Finally, it is interesting to note that the negative
impact of employee voice on employment levels
in the private sector appears to be specific to
union representation and does not extend to
alternative, non-union channels of
communication. Unlike the presence of trade
unions, the existence of solely non-union
channels of communication between
management and employees did not act to
depress the rate of employment growth.3 But,
equally, any potentially positive impact upon
levels of productivity or workplace performance
that may be associated with these more direct
methods of communication did not generate
faster rates of employment growth when
compared with workplaces without such
arrangements.
Change in workplace employment levels in
the public sector
Employees can influence workplace
employment change in the public sector
through negotiation over wages and
employment in much the same way as occurs in
the private sector, but the scope for influence
may be more limited, despite a higher incidence
of negotiation over employment and of
recognition for pay bargaining. This is because
centralised wage determination through
national collective bargaining and Pay Review
Bodies limits the scope for employee influence
at workplace level in the public sector. Staffing
levels are commonly set within predetermined
cash limits, with resources allocated according
to the priorities of central and local government.
Consequently, employment growth is most
likely to occur when improving a service is a
high political priority, as in the case of the health
service during the late 1990s. That said,
resources tend to be targeted at best performers.
And so, to the extent that employees influence
workplace performance, they can affect resource
allocation which, in the heavily labour-intensive
public sector, often impacts upon employment
levels.
Public sector workplaces actually grew more
rapidly than workplaces in the private sector
over the 1990s. Setting aside those public sector
workplaces that closed down (7 per cent) and
those that survived to employ between one and
24 employees in 1998 (10 per cent), employment
among the remainder, which employed at least
25 employees in both 1990 and 1998, grew at an
average rate of 1.5 per cent per annum (Table 4).
In further contrast to the private sector, the
average growth rates of workplaces with and
without recognised unions were both positive in
the public sector. Differences between the two
were also less marked. Public sector workplaces
without a recognised union in 1990 grew at an
average rate of 2.9 per cent per annum between
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1990 and 1998, compared with an average rate
of 1.3 per cent among workplaces with
recognised unions.
After controlling for a range of factors
known to influence employment levels, the rate
of growth in employment in public sector
workplaces was found to be lower in larger
workplaces, as observed in the private sector.
However, there was no significant variation by
region or industry.
Furthermore, there was no significant
difference in the rates of growth of public sector
workplaces with and without recognised
unions, once other factors had been accounted
for. In addition, there were no significant
differences according to whether unions in
public sector workplaces negotiated over both
wages and employment, or wages alone. And
there were no significant associations between
the level of coverage of collective bargaining
and rates of employment growth in the public
sector.
Summary
Unions appear to have a more general effect on
employment change than on the extreme case of
workplace closure. Other factors are clearly
important: it is, perhaps, to be expected that
smaller workplaces grow faster than larger
ones, and that growth rates differ according to a
workplace’s activity and location. But the nature
of union representation also appears to impact
upon the level of workplace employment over
time, if only in the private sector.
Employment in the average unionised
workplace in the private sector declined at a
rate of 1.8 per cent per annum between 1990 and
1998, whilst employment in the average non-
union workplace grew at a rate of 1.4 per cent
per annum over the same period. This
difference persisted after controlling for other
factors known to impact upon employment
levels and, so, union recognition is shown to
have restricted the growth of continuing
workplaces in the private sector over the 1990s.
The negative effect of unions on employment
growth was slightly larger in service industries
than in manufacturing, and where multiple
unions were recognised. However, it was
confined to cases in which unions negotiated
over wages but had no role in determining
staffing levels or recruitment. The rate of
employment growth among private sector
workplaces where unions negotiated over
wages and employment was no different to that
seen among workplaces without recognised
unions.
Non-union channels of communication were
not significantly associated with the rate of
employment growth in either the private or
public sectors.
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Trade unions were born out of the desire by
low-paid workers to get a better deal from their
employers. They set out to achieve this by
bargaining, with the strike weapon as their
ultimate sanction. Since those early days, trade
unions have greatly broadened their bargaining
agenda and have spread to large sections of the
economy that have few low-paid workers. But,
in the 1980s and 1990s, their activities were
considerably restricted by legislation aimed at
reducing their power to bargain with
employers. Do they still have an effect on pay?
Do they only achieve higher pay at the expense
of the employer? What characteristics of local
union organisation have the most impact? Do
any other forms of employee representation
increase pay? Do unions increase the provision
of fringe benefits?
How these questions can be addressed by
research
To answer such questions as securely as
possible, we need to use data that are
representative of jobs in the British economy. We
need details of the employees’ pay and hours of
work, and of the part trade unions play, if any,
in setting them. But we must also make
allowance for a host of other factors that affect
people’s pay. The ones most often highlighted in
research studies are:
• the occupation, skill levels, qualifications
and training of the employee
• the employee’s age, gender and family
situation
• whether their skills are in short supply
• dangerous or unpleasant working
conditions
• the competitiveness of the markets to
which the employer provides goods or
services
• the profitability of the business
• the size of the workplace and the
organisation.
The WERS 1998 dataset provides this mix of
data. Some of the data are supplied by employees
themselves; the rest is provided by the
management interviewee about the workplace
and its component workforce. The only
significant exclusion from WERS 1998 is data
about employees in the smallest workplaces –
those with less than ten employees.
How we define ‘pay’
Employees in WERS 1998 were asked how
much they were ‘paid for their job before tax
and other deductions were taken out’. They
responded by ticking one of 12 boxes
corresponding to bands of weekly pay (for
example, £181 to £220 per week). We could have
used these data on weekly pay directly, but the
associations revealed in the analysis might have
been confounded by differences in hours
worked. So, we converted the data into hourly
pay, with each employee’s pay being reported
within a band (which could vary from one
employee to another). The resulting variable can
be analysed with the same statistical methods
that are well established for the analysis of
weekly pay that is reported in fixed bands.1
4 Pay levels and fringe benefits
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The sets of influences that have a bearing on
pay levels vary markedly between the private
sector and the public sector, so we treat the two
sectors separately in this chapter.
Private sector pay – employer and
workplace influences
In analysing pay in the private sector, we
control as far as possible for differences in
‘human capital’ and other personal
characteristics that give rise to higher pay. The
validity of the data is reinforced by the fact that
the results show pay levels to be higher for
employees:
• in higher-level occupations
• with greater autonomy in their job
• with higher qualifications
• with substantial recent training
• who are older
• who have been longer with their
employer.
Similarly, the results confirm previous studies
by showing that women earn less than men and
that employees with a work-impairing disability
earn less than others, when other relevant
factors are taken into account. However, some
job characteristics that are largely at the
discretion of management have an impact that
is less well established from previous research.
Job characteristics
The analysis shows that temporary or fixed-
term contract jobs are paid about 10 per cent less
than similar permanent jobs filled by similar
employees. More surprising is that employees
who work additional hours voluntarily have a
lower hourly wage than those who only work
their contractual hours. Many of the employees
who work extra hours get paid for them, but the
additional unpaid hours worked by others
combine to give a lower hourly return for
employees working voluntary overtime as a
whole. Where employees work extra hours
compulsorily, their weekly pay is greater, but
their hourly pay is no different from comparable
employees who do not do overtime. On the
other hand, performance-related pay systems
add around 5 per cent to hourly earnings.
Pay also varies between jobs that are largely
done by men and those that are largely done by
women within the same workplace. The
difference between the extreme cases is
remarkable: hourly pay is 13 per cent higher for
jobs done solely by men than for jobs done
solely by women. It seems unlikely that the
whole of this difference is a mere reflection of
occupational segregation at national level.
Management and workplace characteristics
In common with many other studies, the
analysis shows a substantial wage premium for
working in large workplaces. In this case, it is
only apparent when workplace size is over 200
employees. In the largest workplaces (500 or
more employees), there is a substantial
premium of 17 per cent over the smallest
workplaces (ten to 24 employees). There is also
a premium of around 10 per cent attached to
working for a foreign enterprise. But, in contrast
to other studies, the results show no advantage
in working for larger enterprises. Managerial
regimes make a difference, though. Employers
that use a range of labour management practices
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exemplifying a ‘high involvement’ approach
pay around 7 per cent more than those using
very few of the practices.2
These and other factors account for most of
the pay differences that are generally seen
across industrial sectors, apart from the two
cases of wholesale and retail distribution and
hotels and restaurants, sectors renowned for
their low rates of pay. Further variables that
control for the intensity of competition faced by
the employer in the product market, the state of
the product market and the workplace’s recent
financial performance show largely non-
significant effects. However, there are clear
relationships between the state of the labour
market and the level of pay. Employers in tight
labour markets pay higher wages, as do those
situated in London, where national employers
often include an explicit allowance for the
relatively high cost of living.
Private sector pay – the influence of unions
All the factors mentioned above were taken into
account when we examined the data further to
see what effect trade unions and other employee
representation arrangements might have upon
pay levels. We tried a number of different
formulations of how employees were
represented by trade unions. Only some of these
show a significant wage advantage.
The analysis shows that, in general, there is
no significant difference in pay arising from
unions bargaining with employers in the private
sector. On average, the pay of employees who
are covered by collective bargaining between
their employer and a union or unions is a mere
3 per cent higher than the pay of other
employees – a difference that is not statistically
significant. Nor, when we examine the type of
pay-setting arrangement in more detail, are
there substantial differences. It matters little
whether collective bargaining is carried out at
workplace level with the employer as a whole
or with multiple employers at industry or
regional level. Similarly, there are no differences
according to whether employees’ pay is set by
management at the workplace or at a higher
level in the organisation.
The impact of collective bargaining coverage
Where we do find significant differences is in
workplaces where a large proportion of
employees are covered by union bargaining
arrangements. As Table 6 shows, the critical
threshold is about 70 per cent. Above this,
employees are paid substantially more than
employees not covered by collective bargaining.
More precisely, the 19 per cent of employees in
the private sector in workplaces where
bargaining covers between 70 and 99 per cent of
the workforce are paid significantly more than
employees where there is no bargaining. Their
gain averages about 9 per cent. Surprisingly,
perhaps, there is no pay advantage where
bargaining covers all employees (including
workplace managers). This appears to reflect
other indicators of the relative weakness of
unions in these particular cases.
The spillover of the union impact on pay
But the employees in these workplaces with
high levels of collective bargaining coverage are
not the only ones to benefit. The other group of
beneficiaries from the unions’ efforts are
employees in the same workplaces whose pay is
settled unilaterally by management (Table 7).
On average, they are paid 14 per cent higher
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than employees in workplaces with no union
coverage, whereas the ‘covered’ employees are
paid 8 per cent more. While it is not certain that
the non-covered employees benefit more than
those covered by the union arrangements, it is
clear that the benefits of the unions’ bargaining
activity do spill over to other employees at the
same workplace. Some of the employees who
benefit are in lower occupations than those that
the unions represent and hence are lower paid.
But most of them are higher paid senior
professionals and managers. These higher paid
employees are generally not union members,
but they gain from the efforts of the unions
representing their fellow workers who, in the
case of managers, are also their subordinates.
Table 7 Pay premiums in the private sector according to individual and workplace coverage, 1998
Proportion of employees at
workplace covered by collective Employee covered by collective Employee not
bargaining (%)  bargaining arrangements individually covered
1–69 3 –4
70–99 8** 14*
Source: WERS 1998; 14,913 employees in private sector workplaces with ten or more employees.
Key to significance: * = 95% confidence; ** = 99% confidence.
Note: Premium calculated in comparison with employees in workplaces with no collective
bargaining.
Table 6 Pay premiums in the private sector according to the coverage of collective bargaining at the
employee’s workplace, 1998
Average percentage difference
Proportion of employees at in pay compared with Proportion of employees
workplace covered by collective employees in workplaces  receiving this premium
bargaining (%) with no collective bargaining on average (%)
1–39 –2 4
40–59 1 3
60–69 2 2
70–79 12** 4
80–89 10* 4
90–99 7** 11
100 2 12
Source: WERS 1998; 14,913 employees in private sector workplaces with ten or more employees.
Key to significance: * = 95% confidence; ** = 99% confidence.
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The impact of multi-union representation
Separate analysis shows that the impact of
union bargaining is confined to situations where
more than one union is involved (Table 8).
Employees covered by such arrangements
(around 15 per cent of employees in the private
sector) are typically paid 11 per cent more than
employees in non-union workplaces. The
smaller number of employees in these same
multi-union workplaces who are not
individually covered by the union bargaining
arrangements are also paid at similarly
advantageous levels over comparable
employees elsewhere. Representation by a
single union, however, carries no pay
advantage, whether or not the individual
employee is covered. In this respect,
representation by a single union, often
advocated in ‘partnership’ arrangements, is less
advantageous to the employee than
arrangements where separate unions represent
different occupational groups.
The form of multi-union arrangement makes
no difference to the advantage conferred by
multi-union representation. Unions that
negotiate jointly at a ‘single table’ fare no better
or worse than those that negotiate separately
with management.
Employee voice arrangements that confer no
pay advantage
Where pay is not negotiated with trade unions,
managements sometimes consult employees
collectively about pay matters through a joint
consultative committee. Around 18 per cent of
employees in the private sector work in
workplaces with such consultation. Their pay is
no different from employees in workplaces
where there is no consultation over pay issues.
Similarly, non-union representatives have no
detectable impact on pay levels.
The provision of fringe benefits in the
private sector
Fringe benefits such as pensions and longer
holidays can be provided by employers for a
number of reasons: to elicit loyalty and
commitment, to compensate for relatively poor
pay, and so on. Unions generally see them as
Table 8 Pay premiums in the private sector according to individual coverage by collective bargaining and
multi-unionism, 1998
Number of recognised unions Employee covered by collective Employee not
at workplace  bargaining arrangements individually covered
One 1 1
Two or more 11** 14**
Source: WERS 1998; 14,913 employees in private sector workplaces with ten or more employees.
Key to significance: ** = 99% confidence.
Note: Premium calculated in comparison with employees in workplaces with no collective
bargaining.
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beneficial to members and part of their
bargaining agenda. We examined data from the
management interview in WERS 1998 to see
whether union representation increases the
likelihood of employers providing two common
fringe benefits: employer-provided pensions
and extra-statutory sick pay. The questions were
asked only about the largest occupational group
of employees, excluding managers, at each
sampled workplace. Typically, this group
contains two-thirds of the non-managerial
workforce, so the findings are broadly
applicable to all non-managerial employees in
the private sector.
The statistical analysis3 takes account of a
number of workforce and workplace
characteristics which previous studies have
shown to be relevant to fringe benefit provision.
These include the gender composition of the
largest occupational group, the degree to which
it involves part-time work, the size and
industrial activity of the workplace, and so on.
However, in contrast to the analysis of pay
described above, in the analysis of pension
provision, the workplace characteristics are
being used as proxies for the characteristics of
whole enterprises, since pension provision is
generally on an enterprise-wide basis (Casey et
al., 1996, p. 49). There is a further contrast. In the
pay analysis, we examine factors that are either
contemporaneous with the observed pay levels
or can be reasonably taken as predating them;
causal links can thus be plausibly inferred.
However, most employers’ pension schemes
have existed for many years (Forth and
Millward, 1999) so the analysis can only reveal
associations, not causal links.
Employer pension schemes
Just over half of all private sector workplaces
with ten or more employees provided a pension
scheme to members of the largest occupational
group within their workforce in 1998. Provision
was significantly more common:
• for professional and technical
occupations4
• in larger workplaces and in older
workplaces
• in large enterprises
• in workplaces with better than average
financial performance
• in a tight local labour market.
Provision was less likely:
• where high proportions of young workers
were employed
• in declining product markets.
Unions and pension provision
The analysis shows clear associations between
certain forms of union representation and the
provision of pensions. Pensions are six times
more likely where the occupational group is
covered by collective bargaining arrangements
that apply to their enterprise as a whole than in
cases where there is no union representation.
And they are four times more likely where the
employees are represented by a single
recognised trade union. But these are the only
types of employee representation that are
positively associated with pension provision in
an unambiguous way. There is a weak
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association with union representation as a
whole, but none with multi-union
representation, which has a clear advantage in
the case of pay, discussed earlier. The results do,
however, suggest that, if union pressure
increases the likelihood of pension provision for
the largest occupational group, it also benefits
other groups of employees in the same
workplace or enterprise. None of the non-union
forms of employee representation that we
examined has any association with pension
provision at all.
Extra-statutory sick pay
The analysis of sick-pay provision closely
followed the analysis of pension provision,
described above. However, the results can be
interpreted with more confidence because sick-
pay arrangements are subject to greater
workplace autonomy than pension schemes
(Marginson et al., 1988, pp. 186–91) and so a
workplace-level analysis is more appropriate. It
also seems likely that sick-pay arrangements are
generally of more recent vintage than pension
schemes, so the drawing of causal inferences is
less problematic.
Two-thirds of private sector workplaces with
ten or more employees provided sick pay in
excess of statutory requirements to members of
the largest occupational group within their
workforce in 1998. Provision was more common:
• for professional, technical and associated
occupations and sales occupations
• for employees in receipt of performance-
related pay
• in larger workplaces
• in those with high proportions of older
workers
• in workplaces belonging to larger
enterprises
• in tight local labour markets.
Unions and extra-statutory sick pay
Here the link with union representation is
clearer: the odds of the largest occupational
group being provided with sick pay in excess of
statutory requirements are significantly
enhanced under collective bargaining. In fact,
the odds are more than tripled. Sick pay
provision is more likely whatever level pay is
negotiated at. Paralleling the patterns with
respect to higher pay, sick pay is more
commonly provided where there are multiple
unions and where 70–99 per cent of employees
are covered by bargaining. However, there are
no discernible spillover effects to other
employees in the same workplace; employers
appear to be selective in their use of enhanced
sick-pay as an inducement to long-term
commitment.
Yet, in this analysis, the general effect of
unionism seems stronger than on pay levels.
And, so, groups covered by single recognised
unions, groups without access to local
representatives and those in workplaces where
strong management support for membership
has not been secured are also more likely to be
provided for than groups not covered by
collective bargaining.
28
Who calls the tune at work?
Pay in the public sector
In separate analysis of the public sector, we
again establish the importance of a number of
personal, job and workplace characteristics that
have to be taken into account before looking in
detail at the effect of institutional arrangements
on pay levels. There are fewer of them than in
the private sector. Fewer occupations towards
the lower end of the hierarchy are paid
substantially more than unskilled workers, but
qualifications, training, age and length of
service all increase pay levels in the same
general way as in the private sector. However,
the public sector appears to give greater
additional rewards for degrees and for longer
periods of employer-provided training. In terms
of personal and family characteristics, the
results suggest a small male–female differential
and no extra disadvantage for women with
young children. The wage penalty associated
with disability in the private sector is not
apparent in the public sector.
Temporary jobs carry no wage penalty in the
public sector and there is no clear premium on
hourly pay from having performance-related
pay elements. Public sector jobs that entail
voluntary overtime produce a significantly
lower hourly wage, as in the private sector. Part-
time jobs pay somewhat higher hourly wages
than full-time jobs, other things equal. Gender
segregation within the workplace has a similar
effect as in the private sector, with jobs done
exclusively by women paying much less than
those done exclusively by men.
Public sector pay is responsive to fewer
workplace and contextual characteristics than
pay in the private sector. Workplace size has no
impact. The very largest organisations possibly
pay less than smaller ones, as in the private
sector. Unlike the private sector, pay levels are
unaffected by the presence of ‘high-
involvement’ management practices.
Workplaces with a relatively high concentration
of part-time employees pay lower hourly wages
or salaries, although the effect appears smaller
than in the private sector. Compensating
differentials for hazardous working conditions
are not apparent. Unlike the private sector, there
is no evidence of higher pay in tight labour
markets, but there is a similar-sized premium
attached to jobs in the London area.
The impact of wage-setting institutions in the
public sector
Union representation of some form or another is
very widespread in the public sector and pay-
setting arrangements are much more centralised
than in the private sector. Indeed, 63 per cent of
employees have their pay negotiated by trade
unions at a level above the workplace and a
further 22 per cent have their pay set by a
higher authority, usually central government
after the recommendations of a Review Body.
This makes it much more difficult to isolate a
distinct union impact on wages in the public
sector with the workplace-based data from
WERS.
The analysis suggests that, after controlling
for the personal, job and workplace
characteristics mentioned above, there is no
significant difference in the public sector
between pay that results from union
negotiations and pay determined in other ways.
The only institutional difference we can discern
is between employees whose pay results from
multi-employer (national) bargaining and those
whose pay is determined by bargaining at a
higher level than the workplace in their own
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organisation. The latter typically have hourly
pay of around 4 per cent less than the former.
This modest difference could be a symptom of
the abandonment of multi-employer bargaining
in several parts of the public sector as part of the
previous government’s policy of decentralising
pay determination, leaving some employers a
greater freedom to contain pay increases. But
there may well be other explanations. Put
simply, public sector pay levels appear to be
largely unaffected by the particular mechanism
through which they are decided. There is no
clear effect arising from direct negotiations
between trade unions and employers, as against
making representations to a Review Body, with
the government making the ultimate decision.
Summary
The research confirms that trade unions
continue to have an impact on private sector
pay levels, even in their weakened state
compared with earlier times. The effect is,
however, not a general one. It is only discernible
where pay-setting arrangements cover at least
70 per cent of employees in the workplace or
where multiple unions are involved. Unions are
also associated with greater provision of some
fringe benefits in much the same circumstances
as where they achieve higher pay. Other
employees also benefit from the unions’
bargaining activity, commonly managers and
higher paid professional workers in the same
workplaces.
Figure 1 Variation of the extent of the direct and indirect impact of effective union bargaining in the private
sector, by hourly earnings level, 1998
Source: WERS 1998; employees in private sector workplaces with ten or more employees.
Note: Effective union bargaining is measured by the presence of multiple recognised unions or between 70 and 99 per cent
of employees at the workplace being covered by union bargaining.
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Figure 1 summarises how these two effects
bore upon employees at different parts of the
pay distribution in the private sector in early
1998. The direct impact of union bargaining
affected a mere 6 or 7 per cent of employees at
the bottom end of the pay distribution, where
wages were only £1 or £2 per hour.5 The most
extensive impact of unions was for people being
paid between £5 and £10 per hour – at least a
quarter of them benefited directly from union
bargaining. At higher pay levels, the effect was
less widespread. But the indirect impact was at
its most extensive in this upper section of the
pay distribution – at £10 an hour or more, over
15 per cent of employees benefited from the
spillover from union bargaining on behalf of,
not themselves, but other employees at their
workplace.
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How unions might affect pay settlements
Trade unions affect, or might affect, the way
employers set the pay of employees in several
respects. First of all, by obtaining the employers’
agreement to negotiate about the pay of a group
of employees, they crystallise the definition of
groups of employees whose pay is always
reviewed together. The new statutory
recognition procedure contained in the 1999
Employment Relations Act uses the term
‘bargaining unit’ to describe such a group of
employees, but the term is equally applicable to
groups of employees who achieved union
recognition by voluntary means, as is usually
the case. Second, unions might stimulate
employers into reviewing pay levels more
regularly and perhaps more frequently. Third,
they might affect the size of the settlement. This
chapter examines each of these aspects of pay
settlements.
Data and methods
The data used in the analysis come from the
management interviews in WERS 1998 and refer
to the most recent settlement at the time of the
interview; thus, the settlements occurred mostly
in the period early 1997 to early 1998. They are
focused upon the largest occupational group
(excluding managers) and are not therefore fully
representative of the settlements for all
employees. However, in two-thirds of
workplaces, the largest occupational group
formed the majority of employees; and, overall,
employees in the largest occupational group
formed 60 per cent of all employees. In addition,
where questions were also asked about other
groups of employees in the same workplace, the
results show considerable uniformity with the
largest occupational group.1 So, although not
perfect, these data are very strongly indicative
of settlements in the economy as a whole during
the period in question.2 For simplicity, we refer
to employees in the largest occupational group
as ‘core employees’.
How pay is determined
Structure
In around a quarter of workplaces, core
employees have their basic pay set by collective
bargaining. In the private sector, the figure is a
mere 15 per cent. In half of these, the bargaining
covered more than one workplace of their
enterprise; in a quarter, it was confined to their
own workplace; and, in the remaining quarter, it
was set by multi-employer, industry-wide
bargaining. So, most private sector settlements
are the result of unilateral management
decision-making, more usually at workplace
level (44 per cent of workplaces), but also
commonly by higher-level management (27 per
cent). In the public sector, Pay Review Bodies
are the main alternative to collective bargaining,
which affected core employees in three-fifths of
workplaces.
Process
Where pay is ostensibly set by collective
bargaining, it is not always clear that unions
play an active role in negotiations. The evidence
here is confined to cases where core employees
were reported by managers to have their pay set
through bargaining at the workplace or a higher
level in the same organisation. In one-sixth of
these cases, the manager said that no union
representative or official was involved in
5 Pay settlements
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arriving at the latest settlement. A similar
proportion said the union had only been
consulted, rather than the settlement having
been negotiated. So, in many cases where pay is
considered to be the result of collective
bargaining, the unions appear to have little
influence on the process.
The frequency of pay reviews
Unions do, however, appear to have an impact
on the frequency with which employers review
pay levels. Where settlements were subject to
negotiation with unions, 96 per cent were the
result of an annual review; 1 per cent conducted
a review more than once a year; and a similarly
small proportion (2 per cent) conducted a
review less than once a year. By contrast, where
employers were free to choose the frequency of
settlements, only 86 per cent had based their
most recent settlement on an annual review; 6
per cent conducted a review more than once a
year; 7 per cent did so less than once a year.
Annual reviews are a very strong norm where
collective bargaining occurs, irrespective of the
sector, industry or occupation of the employees
affected.
The size of pay settlements
The largely annual reviews of pay for core
employees generally resulted in a pay increase.
In only 3 per cent of cases was the outcome a
standstill or a decrease in basic pay, usually
because the employer was in financial
difficulties.
The uniformity of pay increases
Pay increases were heavily concentrated around
3 per cent. This was the most common figure in
both the private and public sectors. Other very
common figures in the public sector were 2.5
and 2 per cent; together these accounted for
over a half of public sector cases. Increases were
very similar in size in the public sector, whether
they resulted from collective bargaining or other
means, largely Review Bodies. In the private
sector, there was greater variation, shown in
Figure 2. The remainder of the analysis focuses
on explaining this variation in the private sector.
The size of pay increases in the private sector
About a tenth of private sector increases were of
7.5 per cent or above, with many of these at 10
per cent or more. Detailed examination showed
that these were mostly cases where the majority
of employees at the workplace were paid less
than £4 per hour after the settlement. It seems
clear that these were exceptional increases that
anticipated the introduction of the National
Minimum Wage, introduced a year later. In
what follows, we focus on the bulk of cases in
the private sector – those with increases below
7.5 per cent – where statistical analysis can
provide some assessment of the main factors at
work.3
Before examining the possible impact of
trade union involvement in the pay-setting
process, the analysis took account of a number
of factors that generally preceded the pay
settlement and could be expected to have led to
a larger increase. The results established that
increases were lower where the workplace’s
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recent financial performance was poor and were
larger where:
• the workplace was expanding its
workforce
• the workplace was more than five years
old
• the workplace was foreign owned and
core employees were higher-paid
professionals
• core employees were in the lowest-paid
occupations in industries with many low-
paid employees (again reflecting
anticipation of the National Minimum
Wage).
There were also less robust indications that
pay increases were higher where:
• inflation was higher just before the
settlement was made
• recent sales of goods or services were
rising faster than labour productivity
• average earnings in the industry had
increased more rapidly and managers
reported that their settlement matched
that of similar employers
• core workers were becoming more
‘functionally flexible’.
And they were lower where:
• the risk of redundancies was reported as
important
• the workplace was recruiting core
employees at a time when they were
becoming more plentiful
Figure 2 Size of most recent settlement for largest occupational group, private sector, 1998
Source: WERS 1998; workplaces in the private sector with ten or more employees reporting a pay increase for the largest
occupational group.
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• performance-related pay was becoming a
higher proportion of total pay, with basic
pay being correspondingly reduced as a
proportion.
All these factors were taken into account
when we focused analysis on the question of
whether collectively bargained pay increases
were different from those decided unilaterally
by management.
In essence, they were no different. Where
core employees had their pay set by collective
bargaining, the size of the increase was not
significantly different from that received by core
employees elsewhere whose pay was not
determined through bargaining.4 Of course, it
would have been surprising if bargained
settlements had been larger than non-bargained
ones. This would imply that any pay premium
gained by unions was growing, an unlikely
situation when so many other indicators of
union strength have been pointing the opposite
way. Another possible interpretation of the
result might be that unions were maintaining a
general wage advantage for the employees they
covered. But we showed in the previous chapter
that there was no such general union pay
premium in 1998. Only specific types of union
representation were associated with
demonstrably higher pay when other relevant
factors were taken into account. Multi-union
representation was particularly linked with
higher levels of pay. So, did this specific type of
union representation have smaller pay
increases, reflecting the general fall in union
strength? The answer is yes. Increases achieved
for core employees in multi-union situations
were significantly lower than other pay
settlements in the same period, around 0.3 per
cent lower on average.5
However, there were other features of union
representation which had higher pay levels (as
shown in Chapter 4) but which did not have
lower settlements in the period 1997–98.
Settlements were slightly lower in these cases,
but not significantly so. It may be that they
would also turn out to have lower increases if
observations were available over a longer
period.
Summary
Basic pay is adjusted annually for most
employees and this is particularly the case
where trade unions are involved. But unions
appear to affect the process of pay
determination more than the outcome. Pay
increases in the private sector are no greater
where unions are involved in negotiations,
when other factors suggested by economic
theory are taken into account. If anything, it is
more likely that they are smaller. Employees
covered by multi-union representation, who
were paid more than other comparable
employees in 1998, had smaller pay increases at
that time. This is consonant with the long-term
decline in influence that British unions have
experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. It suggests
that any pay premium for unionised employees
will become confined to a smaller and smaller
portion of those covered by collective
bargaining. Indeed, it may gradually disappear
in the future, unless the causes of union
weakness are addressed.
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Developments during the 1990s saw the British
labour market make a further move away from
its earlier position where trade unions had
played a substantial part in shaping jobs and
pay. Much of this came about through the
increasing turnover amongst workplaces: new
service sector workplaces, mostly untouched by
unionism, replaced older workplaces, often in
manufacturing, where unions had been well
established. By 1998, less than a third of
employees in the private sector were covered by
pay-setting arrangements in which unions
played a role; and many fewer than that were
employed in workplaces where unions played a
part in management decisions about the
numbers of jobs.
In these changed circumstances, the question
arose as to whether unions still had an impact
on pay levels and on the creation, retention or
destruction of jobs. The question has acquired
greater importance, now that recent legislation
enables unions to achieve recognition from
some employers in circumstances where they
would not otherwise have achieved it
voluntarily. The direct and indirect effects of the
legislation might be to slow down or even arrest
the decline in union representation for pay
bargaining that has been in evidence for over 20
years. Such a prospect gives added saliency to
the impact of unions on pay and jobs.
The impact of trade unions on pay
The research confirms that trade unions
continue to have an impact on private sector
pay levels, but only in particular situations, not
in general. Only where union–management
pay-setting arrangements cover at least 70 per
cent of employees in the workplace, or where
multiple unions are involved, are pay levels
clearly higher than for comparable employees in
similar workplaces. In these circumstances,
which apply to around 15 per cent of private
sector employees, a premium of around 8 to 11
per cent is typical. Unions are also associated
with greater provision of some fringe benefits in
much the same circumstances as where they
achieve higher pay. A smaller group of other
employees also benefit from the unions’ pay-
bargaining activity, even though they are not
directly covered by it. They are commonly
managers and higher paid professional workers
in the same workplaces.
It seems very likely that the union impact on
pay is smaller now than it was previously. There
are no directly comparable datasets for earlier
periods on which we could repeat our analysis
and confirm that judgement. But there are many
indications from other research that unions have
become weaker in the last two decades. They
certainly represent many fewer employees. Our
analysis of pay settlements in 1997–98 also
supports the idea of a declining impact on pay
levels. Settlements were no higher where unions
were involved and in some circumstances were
lower than for comparable workers in non-
union situations. Indeed, the multi-union
bargaining situations that clearly showed higher
levels of basic pay were the ones that also
clearly showed smaller pay increases in our
analysis of settlements. These multi-union
situations are becoming increasingly rare,
reinforcing the likelihood of a disappearing
union impact on pay levels.
6 Conclusions and policy implications
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The impact of trade unions on employment
levels
The research examined the potential impact of
trade unions on the number of jobs in the
economy in two separate ways. The first
concerned the likelihood of complete closure of
a workplace between 1990 and 1998. This was
found to be no different for union and non-
union workplaces in the major part of the
economy – the service sector, whether public or
private. However, the impact of unions was
clearly discernible in manufacturing. Closure in
this sector was more likely where there had
been unions representing a section of the
workforce, such as only manual workers, and
where unions were excluded from negotiating
with management about employment matters,
such as recruitment and staffing levels. Where
representation and negotiating arrangements
were comprehensive, the potential negative
effects of unions in the manufacturing sector
were absent.
The second way in which the research
examined the possible impact of trade unions
on the numbers of jobs was by comparing the
rates of growth or contraction among
continuing workplaces from 1990 to 1998. In the
private sector, unions generally served to inhibit
employment growth by several percentage
points per annum. This negative impact was
slightly larger in service industries than in
manufacturing, and where multiple unions
were recognised. However, it was confined to
cases in which unions negotiated over wages
but had no role in determining staffing levels or
recruitment. The rate of employment growth
among private sector workplaces where unions
negotiated over wages and employment was no
different to that seen among workplaces
without recognised unions.
Future implications
An important implication of the findings is how
the economy might be affected by the new legal
provisions through which trade unions can
achieve recognition from employers to negotiate
about pay, hours of work and holidays. Such
cases are likely to form only a small fraction of
instances of newly granted recognition. But the
legal provisions seem most likely to encourage
the creation of a particular type of bargaining
unit: one with a single union representing
employees, principally in cases where the
employer does not already recognise another
union for different groups of employees. If the
bargaining unit is defined broadly (and initial
indications are that this is generally so),1 these
cases of new recognition will resemble the
situations of high coverage at workplace level
that, in the 1990s, were associated with
employment decline in the private sector and a
greater chance of closure in manufacturing
industry. The results also suggest that these
undesirable consequences for employment
might be avoided if managements and unions
agreed to a broad bargaining agenda that gave
the union a role in decisions about employment
as well as pay. But there seems little prospect of
this happening generally in those few situations
where an employer has been obliged to
recognise a union for bargaining about pay
through recourse to the law.
In cases where unions achieve recognition
without using the new legal provisions, the
findings give a clear pointer to management for
avoiding the possible negative impact of unions
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on employment – they shall encompass a wide
range of issues, including recruitment and
staffing levels, within the scope of joint
regulation. In workplaces where unions are
already recognised for pay bargaining, the
findings suggest it would be beneficial to
expand the scope of negotiations to include
employment matters in the majority of
unionised workplaces in the private sector that
do not currently do so. Such a move seems
likely to benefit employees and employers alike.
As we noted in Chapter 1, the achievement
of statutory recognition does not guarantee a
pay agreement, let alone one that specifies basic
rates of pay higher than for comparable
employees elsewhere. Thus, the statutory
procedure seems very unlikely to lead to
recognition being granted on such a scale, and
in sufficient numbers of cases that lead to
substantial and enduring pay increases, that the
trend towards a disappearing union pay
premium would be arrested or reversed. This
implies that employers should have little
ground for opposing union recognition on the
basis that granting it might lead to unacceptably
higher wage costs. Correspondingly, unions are
likely to gradually lose the legitimacy of their
appeal for new members on the grounds that
they generally achieve higher pay levels.
The vast majority of unionised workplaces in
Britain will continue to be those where union
recognition was achieved voluntarily at some
time in the past, without recourse to the law. In
this shrinking but still substantial part of the
economy, a gradual decline in the impact of
unions on wage levels seems likely. Since the
existing union impact is most apparent in the
middle part of wage distribution, this decline is
likely to reinforce the current trend towards
greater wage dispersion and income inequality.
A widening of the gender pay gap is also
possible, since union representation is
associated with practices, such as analytical job
evaluation, which are in turn associated with
smaller pay differences between men and
women. Both these matters bear on more
general considerations of public policy.
A final implication of the research concerns
the types of non-union consultative and
information-sharing practices that are currently
being considered under European Union
auspices. In so far as they have a similar impact
to corresponding practices in Britain that are
introduced voluntarily by employers, the
research implies that they will have no
detectable impact on pay levels or the growth of
jobs.
38
Chapter 1
1 Unless the written agreement contains a
statement that it is intended to be a legally
enforceable contract. This is very rare.
2 There is, for example, no requirement for
binding arbitration.
3 Import penetration in manufacturing
increased steadily year on year from 37 per
cent in 1989 to 46 per cent in 1996 (Central
Statistical Office, 1993, p. 219; Office of
National Statistics, 1999, Table 18.2). The
percentage of private sector establishments
owned or controlled by foreign
organisations increased from 8 to 13 per
cent (Millward et al., 2000, pp. 32–4).
4 Based on regional rates of unemployment
derived from claimant counts given in
Labour Market Trends. Comparable earlier
figures are not available.
5 Based upon unemployment rates (ILO
definition) by previous occupation for the
United Kingdom, derived from the relevant
Labour Force Surveys, reported in Labour
Market Trends. Comparable earlier figures
are not available.
6 The questionnaire was distributed to all
employees where there were less than 25.
Chapter 2
1 The transfer of employment to a new site or
to another workplace in the same
organisation is not included in this
definition, nor is a simple change of
ownership such as a take-over.
2 The low level of unionisation in the private
sector supports this view. Only one private
sector industry (electricity, gas and water
supply) out of 14 industries has over a half
of its workforce belonging to trade unions
(Bland, 1999).
3 A 1992 survey of large, multi-site companies
showed that many of those with recognised
unions in their existing workplaces set up
new workplaces without recognising unions
in them. This was more common where
existing bargaining arrangements were
decentralised (Marginson et al., 1993).
4 The data are therefore confined to
workplaces with at least 25 employees in
1990, this being the sampling population for
WIRS 1990.
5 Our measures of union strength included
the proportion of workers in union
membership, the existence of a closed shop,
the presence of an on-site representative,
and the existence of formal agreements
restricting management’s ability to organise
non-managerial staff.
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Notes
6 Non-union communication channels
consisted of non-union appointments to
joint consultative committees, the presence
of briefing groups, regular meetings
between senior management and the
workforce, problem-solving groups and the
presence of non-union representatives
where there were no union members.
7 Those that were significant in the analysis
were: the size of the workplace in 1990, the
trend in employment in the previous year,
the age of the workplace, the proportions of
the workforce female and part-time, and
three individual industries.
Chapter 3
1 Many earlier studies of employment change
in Britain have relied upon retrospective
information on changes in workplace
employment levels, and have sought to
explain change by reference to
characteristics observed at the end of the
period in question. However, if one were to
find an association between the contraction
of workplace employment and strong
unionism in such a study, questions would
inevitably arise over the true direction of
causality.
2 We experimented with the use of statistical
methods that adjust for the ‘selective’ nature
of the sample available to us – see Bryson
(2001) for details. However, we were unable
to find a sufficiently robust solution that
could be used extensively throughout this
chapter and reported with confidence.
3 See Chapter 2, note 6 above.
Chapter 4
1 The method was originally developed by
Stewart (1983b) and used to show how the
union effect on wages changed over the
1980s (Stewart, 1995). The current work
extends that methodology to situations
where the pay bands vary across
observations. See the Appendix in Forth and
Millward (2000a).
2 To be characterised as having ‘high
involvement management’, a workplace
had to have at least two out of three ‘task
practices’ (teamworking, functional
flexibility and quality circles), two out of
four ‘individual supports’ (briefing groups,
information disclosure, performance
appraisal and human relations training) and
two out of three ‘organisational supports’
(internal recruitment, job security and
financial participation). Further details are
given in Forth and Millward (2000a).
3 Since the information available is simply
provision or non-provision of the benefit,
the statistical procedure used was logistic
regression.
4 This is also the case for managers, but they
were excluded from the relevant questions
in WERS 1998.
5 The survey fieldwork preceded the
introduction of the National Minimum
Wage of £3.60 in April 1999.
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Chapter 5
1 In 68 per cent of workplaces, the same type
of arrangement is used for all occupational
groups present (Forth and Millward, 2000b).
2 Being derived from a nationally
representative sample of workplaces, they
come far closer to a comprehensive sample
of pay settlements than the other British
source used in research, the CBI Pay
Settlements Databank.
3 The distribution of the size of increases
greater than zero and less than 7.5 per cent
approximates to a normal distribution and
is therefore amenable to Ordinary Least
Squares regression. The base is 1,079
observations.
4 The actual coefficient was –0.093, which is
not significant, even at the 10 per cent level.
5 Increases achieved for core employees in
single-union situations were not
significantly different from those in non-
union situations.
Chapter 6
1 Up to 23 March 2001, the Central
Arbitration Committee had granted
statutory recognition in five cases covering
approximately 1,400 employees. In two of
these cases, the bargaining units covered at
least 70 per cent of employees; in the other
three, the proportion was not calculable on
the available data, but was probably much
smaller.
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